Smoking-Cancer Cases: The Plaintiff\u27s Remedies by Balanoff, Michael J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 4 Article 15
7-1-1966
Smoking-Cancer Cases: The Plaintiff 's Remedies
Michael J. Balanoff
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Student Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael J. Balanoff, Smoking-Cancer Cases: The Plaintiff 's Remedies, 7 B.C.L. Rev. 995 (1966), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol7/iss4/15
SMOKING-CANCER CASES: THE PLAINTIFF'S
REMEDIES
The recently published Surgeon General's Report' has created a common
awareness in this country that cigarettes pose a grave health hazard to
smokers.2 This awareness has not, however, produced the reduction in
smoking hoped for by those who endorsed the report,5 perhaps because of
the fundamental factors that cause people to smoke: cigarette smoking is a
habit' often motivated by social and psychological factors. 5 In an apparent
effort to counteract the effects of the Surgeon General's Report, the cigarette
industry is actively engaged in creating a demand for its product through
extensive advertising campaigns, attempting to induce old smokers to continue
and nonsmokers to begin. Thus, seventy million Americans, who presumably
are aware of the risk they incur by smoking, nevertheless, for reasons possibly
unknown to them, continue to smoke.°
This comment examines remedies available to plaintiffs in smoking-
cancer cases. The form of action a plaintiff will choose is predictably con-
trolled by the evidence he can present. Where proof is meager but the forum
willing, he may bring a strict liability action for breach of implied warranty,
either at common law or under the Uniform Commercial Code. In this area
policy considerations dominate. In other cases there may be certain facts on
which to base an action for breach of express warranty or negligence.
Finally, an examination is made of the effects on a plaintiff's case of the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.'
I. IMPLIED WARRANTY—CASE LAW
In 1963 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided two smoking-
cancer cases, Lartigue v. R.I. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 8 based on Louisiana
law, and Green v. American Tobacco Co., 9 decided under Florida law. 1° Both
1 Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, U.S.
Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Smoking and Health (1964) [hereinafter
cited as the Surgeon General's Report].
2 Id, at 31-39.
$ Despite the work of state and local health and education associations which have
instituted smoking education programs in order to alert people to the dangers of smoking,
cigarette sales continue to soar. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1677 . (1965).
4 Surgeon General's Report, supra note 1, at 351.
5 Id. at 40. The drive to use tobacco is psychogenic in nature, and the sudden
removal of cigarettes from the market would present the problem of finding a substitute
to satisfy the psychological needs of over 70 million smokers. Id. at 355.
6 For the view that advertising often causes people to buy things they do not want,
see Greyser, Businessman Re: Advertising: "Yes, But . . ," 40 Harv. Bus. Rev.,
May-June 1962, p. 20, See generally Quinn, Ethics, Advertising and Responsibility
(1963).
7 79 Stat. 282 (1965), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331-39 (Sapp, 1966).
8 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
9 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
10 It is important to note the history of these two cases, In 1962 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that defendant was not liable for harm caused by
unknowable defects in his product. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th
Cir. 1962). In 1963, the Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law and relying on its decision
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cases were breach of warranty actions for wrongful death caused by lung
cancer, which the decedents had allegedly developed by smoking defendants'
cigarettes."
In both instances, the Fifth Circuit held that a manufacturer of products
sold to the public for consumption impliedly warrants that they are rea-
sonably fit and wholesome for the purposes for which they are sold. 12 In
Lartigue, however, the warranty was held not to extend to unknowable
defects" in the manufactured product," whereas in Green the court held the
warranty did so extend. 15 Recovery was ultimately denied in both cases on
findings that cigarettes are reasonably fit and, therefore, that no warranty
was breached. Thus, in order for a plaintiff to prevail against a cigarette
manufacturer, a court must find that (1) an implied warranty extends to
unknowable defects and (2) this warranty is breached when plaintiff's
smoking results in cancer.
A. Extent of the Warranty—Knowable v. Unknowable Defects
The difference between Green and Lartigue as to how far the implied
warranty extends can be explained by an examination of the methods by which
the law of each state was divined. To determine Florida law, the Fifth Circuit
in Green certified a questionm to the Florida Supreme Court, which responded
that the warranty does extend to unknowable defects. 17 In Lartigue, on the
in the 1962 Green case decided Lartigue and held defendant was not liable for harm
caused by unknowable defects in his product. Meanwhile, a determination of Florida
law by the Florida Supreme Court in effect reversed the 1962 holding of the Fifth
Circuit in Green. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). Thus, the
reliability of the Lartigue holding was opened to some doubt, although the decisions
in both cases were based primarily on jurisdictional policies and holdings rather than
on any general well-settled rule of law. However, the Lartigue rule may be considered
vindicated by a later cigarette-cancer case similar on its facts to Lartigue and Green.
See Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964). The court in Ross had both
Lartigue and the final Green opinions before it and chose to follow the Lartigue ruling.
11 The trial judge in Lartigue expressed his opinion that the jury did not believe
plaintiff's evidence as to the causative effects between smoking and cancer.
12 317 F.2d at 37; 325 F.2d at 677.
13 The word "defect," as used in this comment, refers to the general condition of
cigarettes that leads to cancer, rather than to any specific substance that causes the harm.
A defective condition may arise, not only from harmful ingredients which are un-
characteristic of the product, but also from foreign objects, decay or deterioration.
Restatement (Second), Torts § 4D2A, comment (h) (1965). Should it be presumed, then,
that if whatever causes cancer is an element characteristic of tobacco, cigarettes causing
cancer are not defective? See also 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 16.03[41
(1960). "It is a difficult question as to what [is) warranted in some instances, particularly
where the product is not defective as such, e.g., drugs with adverse side effects; cigarettes—
cancer." Id. at 442.5.
14 317 F.2d at 35.
15 325 F.2d at 674-75.
16 This procedure is permitted by Fla. Stats. Ann. ch. 25.031 (1961), which provides
that when a question of state law arises determinative of the issue and there are no clear
controlling precedents in the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, the federal court
may present (certify) questions to the Florida Supreme Court for its determination
thereon.
17 154 So. 2d at 170.
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other hand, the Fifth Circuit determined for itself that a Louisiana court
would hold that the warranty does not so extend.
In reaching its decision in Green, the Florida court reasoned that, under
Florida law, the question of a seller's actual or implied knowledge of defects
is irrelevant to his liability in an implied warranty action and, therefore, the
seller's warranty extends to unknowable defects.18 It is submitted that this
conclusion does not necessarily follow: irrelevancy of actual knowledge
means that it makes no difference that defendant did not know of the defect;
irrelevancy of implied knowledge means that it makes no difference that
defendant was not negligent. 1° It does not follow from either (or both) of
these that the warranty extends regardless of whether defendant, with any
amount of skill, diligence or foresight, could have known of the defect.
The Florida court, then, seems to see little difference between a case
involving a defect which is knowable but unknown, 2° and one which is scientif-
ically unknowable. The court had previously dealt only with the former
type—that which, although potentially discoverable, is either extraordinarily
difficult to detect or detectable only at a prohibitive cost. 21 Because such
defects and the injuries resulting from them generally occur intermittently,
Florida has been willing to place the risk that they will occur on the
manufacturer, who is generally in a better position than the buyer to afford
the expense.22 This reason for imposing strict liability is absent in Green.
The defect, besides being unknowable, is inherent rather than intermittent
and the injury it causes is widespread.
The Fifth Circuit in Lartigue recognized the fact that no intermittent
defect was involved and used that fact as a basis for holding that no warranty
extends to unknowable defects. Thus, Lartigue stands for the proposition that
if the risk inhering in the product is unknowable, there is no "foreseeable"
harm and, therefore, no liability: 23 "The foreseeability here involved is dif-
ferent from that required in negligence cases. It is not the foreseeability of
unreasonable risks, but rather the foreseeability of the kinds of risks which
the enterprise is likely to create" 24 to which the law attaches liability. 25
15 Ibid.
15 Agreeably, proof of lack of due care is not a requisite to an action for breach of
implied warranty. 1 Frumer & Friedman, op. cit. supra note 13, at 383; 1 Williston, Sales
§ 237 (rev. ed. 1948).
20 E.g., Spoiled food in sealed containers, mice in coke bottles, etc. The Florida
Supreme Court analogized this type of defect to the Green case. In such cases it has
never been necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer knew or could
have known of the mouse or the spoliation of the food. Connolly, The Liability of a
Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent in His Product, 32 Ins. Counsel J. 303
(1965).
21 See Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So, 2d 390 (Fla. 1961) ; Sencer v. Carl's
Mkts., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950).
22 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). See also
Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 69 Yale L,J. 1099
(1960).
23 317 F.2d at 35.
24 Id, at 24, quoting James, General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923, 925 (1957).
25 "This is a heavy burden on a manufacturer, but it is a liability only for a defec-
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B. Breach of the Warranty—Standard of Safety
Although Green and Lartigue disagreed as to whether a warranty extends
to unknowable defects, they did agree on the standard of safety to be applied
in determining whether a warranty has been breached. Under Louisiana law,
a manufacturer impliedly warrants that his goods will be reasonably fit and
wholesome for the purpose for which they were made."
Strict liability on the warranty of wholesomeness, without
regard to negligence, "does not mean that goods are warranted to
be foolproof or incapable of producing injury • • . . By and large,
the standard of safety of the goods is the same under the warranty
theofy as under the negligence theory." [To impose strict liability,]
the article sold must be unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary
consumer, with the knowledge common to the community as to its
characterization??
The jury in Lartigue applied this standard and, finding that cigarettes are
reasonably safe, decided there was no breach of warranty."
The court of appeals adopted the Lartigue standard of reasonable safety
in Green29 despite the fact that the Florida Supreme Court had expressed
the view that the fitness of a product should be determined by its actual
safety.3° The application of a standard of actual safety is a logical extension
of the rule that a manufacturer is liable for unknowable defects. By elimi-
nating a foreseeability test, that rule removes any basis for applying a
standard of reasonable safety.
Judge Cameron, dissenting in Green, was probably correct when he
stated that plaintiff should have had judgment on the basis of Florida
law.31 Florida does not base its standard of safety on the law of negligence
with its standard of reasonable care; 32 instead, it is determined by the law
of contracts and is founded in the contract of sale between the seller and
the buyer." Judge Cameron argued that the warranty implied by law in
every sale the company made to the buyer was that the cigarettes he pur-
chased would do him no harm. 34 Thus, he would disregard the Lartigue
tive condition not contemplated by the consumer, the harmful consequences of which,
based on the state of human knowledge, are foreseeable." 317 F.2d at 24. The reasons
for imposing such liability are justified by sound principles of public policy. See Prosser,
supra note 22.
26 317 F.2d at 39.
27 Id. at 37, quoting 2 Harper & James, Law of Torts 1584 (1961). See also Restate-
ment (Second), Torts § 402A, comment (1) (1965): "Good tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful. . ."
28 317 F.2d at 39.
2° Quoted in text accompanying note 27 supra. Compare 325 F.2d at 677.
3° 154 So. 2d at 173. Clearly, the Florida court would apply a "foolproof test"
which the Fifth Circuit in Lartigue and Green expressly rejected. 317 F.2d at 37; 325
F.2d at 677.
31 Id. at 679 (dissenting opinion).





standard of reasonable fitness which the majority adopted 35 and would apply
the standard of actual safety. 3° It seems likely, then, that if a case were
brought in a Florida state court against a cigarette manufacturer on facts
similar to those of Green, the plaintiff would prevail.
II. IMPLIED WARRANTY-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A court in a smoking-cancer suit brought on implied warranty under the
Uniform Commercial Code would face the same problems posed in Green and
Lartigue—extent and breach of warranty. 37 Comment 13 to section 2-314
implies that the warranty of merchantability does not extend to unknowable
defects. In an action for breach of warranty, "evidence indicating that the
seller exercised care in the manufacture, processing or selection of the goods
is relevant to the issue of whether the warranty was in fact broken."'" If the
draftsmen were willing to grant this concession to the careful manufacturer,
it is reasonable to suppose that in a situation where no amount of care could
determine the existence of unknowable defects, a stronger reason for relieving
the manufacturer of liability.""
As to breach of the warranty, merchantability is the general standard
of fitness under the Code. Section 2-314 sets out a list of general standards to
which goods must conform in order to be merchantable.° Applying the Code
requirements to cigarettes, they must "pass without objection in the trade" 41
and be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. . . . ),42
Despite the fact that all cigarettes are probably harmful to health no
one brand has been proved safe), cigarettes do pass on the retail market
without consumer objection and may still be fit for the ordinary purposes
36 Ibid.
36 Id. at 681.
37 See U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 13.
88 Ibid.
39 Although the draftsmen would say that the warranty was not breached rather
than that the warranty did not extend to unknowable defects, this is not important. What
does matter is their desire to allow flexibility in applying doctrines of strict liability in
determining cases against manufacturers for breach of implied warranty.
For a highly incisive discussion on the need for flexibility and imaginative thought
in the clash between developing case law and the Code see Shanker, Strict Tort Theory
of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on juris-
prudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 5
(1965).
40 The relevant parts of U.C.C. § 2-314 are:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goads, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. • • .
41 	§ 2-314(2) (a).
42 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
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for which they were intended. Unlike unwholesome food which is not fit
for eating, unwholesome cigarettes are still fit for smoking, but they may be
held unmerchantable because of the collateral injuries they cause. However,
to conclude that liability automatically follows harm is an oversimplification
that could lead to injustice.43
There is nothing in section 2-314 requiring the standard of fitness to be
actual safety unless that is the only way in which the goods can be made
usable. This is not to say, however, that the Code precludes the courts from
making actual safety the standard of fitness. Section 2-3 14 sets forth only the
minimum standards of merchantability,'" and case law may still set higher
standards than those imposed by the Code 46
III. IMPLIED WARRANTY—POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Thus far, no cancer case has been ultimately decided in favor of a plaintiff,
but it is certainly coinceivable that a court with a liberal doctrine of strict
liability46 will be tempted to apply it to a smoking-cancer case. Cognizant
of the widespread effects 47 of such an application, that court will be faced
with a difficult policy decision. Since the doctrine of strict liability is based
primarily on policy considerations," these considerations should determine
its limits.
Strict liability in tort or for breach of warranty is based primarily on
the notion that he who can best bear the loss for harm he has caused, no mat-
ter how innocently, should pay for that harm." The rationale is that the
cost of insurance against the risks of the enterprise may be spread among
purchasers through higher consumer prices." That rationale may be inap-
43 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117
(1943); Woods, Can Cigarettes Be Merchantable, Though They Cause Cancer? 6 Ariz.
L. Rev. 82 (1964).
44 	§ 2-314(2) begins: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least such
as . . . ." (Emphasis added.) See also U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 6.
45 Ibid.
46 The American Law Institute adopted a liberal rule of strict liability which was
not limited to food products or products for intimate bodily use. Compare Restatement
(Second), Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961), with Restatement (Second), Torts
§ 402A (1965). Section 402A now holds a seller of any product, which is defective and
unreasonably dangerous to the user, strictly liable for physical harm caused to the user.
Law review articles discussing this liberal rule are abundant: Gillam, Products
Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119 (1958) ; James, Products Liability, 34 Texas
L. Rev. 44 (1955); Keeton, Products Liability—Liability Without Fault and the Require-
ment of a Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963) ; Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers,
50 A.BA.J. 446 (1964); Prosser, supra note 22.
47 Finding liability for scientifically unknowable defects may render drug manufac-
turers whose products subsequently prove to have harmful side effects liable for the
unknowable harm caused. E.g., would courts hold the manufacturer of birth control
pills liable if, after twenty years of continuous use women developed unanticipated
illnesses? Suppose the manufacturer had given assurances that there would be no harmful
side effects?
48 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) ; Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).




plicable to a smoking-cancer case because lung cancer is not an intermittent
injury, the risk of which all enterprises encounter and against which they may
insure themselves. The widespread harm caused by cigarette smoking may
make it impossible for the cigarette manufacturers to spread these risks to
smokers. The damages which cigarette manufacturers would have to pay
cancer victims (and victims of any of the other diseases that have been found
to be causally related to smoking) 5 ' could destroy the cigarette industry. 52
Another reason for applying a theory of strict liability is to induce manu-
facturers to use the highest degree of care possible in the production of
their goods." Although proof of due care is generally irrelevant in a strict
liability case, 54 nevertheless, if a manufacturer knows he will be held liable
without fault he will, theoretically at least, take every precaution to ensure the
safety of his product. But when no amount of care could have uncovered the
defect in a product, then this rationale for strict liability also fails to sustain
the application of the doctrine.
IV. EXPRESS WARRANTY
A plaintiff may have a stronger case for recovery if a manufacturer has
advertised that his cigarettes are safe. In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co.," the defendant advertised that, "Nose, Throat And Accessory
Organs Not Adversely Affected By Smoking Chesterfields"; "Chesterfields
Are As Pure As The Water You Drink And The Food You Eat." 56 Under
both the applicable Sales Act 57 and the Code," these statements may have
raised express warranties. The question is still before a jury in Pritchard"
and may well be answered in the affirmative. Undoubtedly, Liggett & Myers
hoped to induce people to purchase Chesterfields by advertising that they were
safe. It is, of course, questionable whether a buyer would have been justified
in relying on such statements, 6° but one who suspected that cigarettes might
be harmful and hoped to find a brand that was not harmful, might success-
fully argue that his reliance was reasonable. If this argument were accepted,
it would then be necessary to show that plaintiff actually bought in reliance
on the assertions expressed in the advertisements and that those cigarettes
51 See Surgeon General's Report, supra note 1, at 31-39.
52 The cigarette industry might be able to sustain high-priced judgments by raising
the price of each package of cigarettes one or two cents. Several questions come to mind
regarding this point. Should the industry be required to bear these expenses by raising
money now to pay for harm which occurred before it had any way of preventing it?
Should the industry be made to pay simply because it has a "deep-pocket"? Should the
law, on the principle that extent of injury is so widespread and still unknown, determine
that this is not the type of case for which it will allow recovery?
53 Prosser, supra note 22. See also Note, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 318 (1963).
54 Supra note 19.
55 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965).
56 Id. at 482. Furthermore, many of the advertisements contained assurances that
the affirmations were based on extensive research and on the opinions of medical
specialists. Ibid.
57 Uniform Sales Act, Pa. Stat. tit. 69, § 121 (repealed).
58 U.C.C. § 2-313.
59 350 F.2d at 486.
60 See Uniform Sales Act 12, Commissioners' Note.
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caused his harm.° 1 In Pritchard, the plaintiff had been smoking Chesterfield
cigarettes for ten years prior to the commencement of the advertising cam-
paign in question, and for thirty years before contracting cancer.° 2 Those
facts alone raise a strong inference that he would have continued to smoke
with or without Liggett & Myers' affirmations. Thus, despite the false claims
on the part of defendant, its conduct may not have been fatal to its case."
Some confusion arose in the court of appeals in Pritchard as to whether
reliance was a necessary factor in a case for breach of express warranty.
Under the Sales Act, in order for an express warranty to be created, it is
necessary that the affirmations be such as would naturally tend to induce the
buyer to purchase the goods and the buyer must purchase relying thereon."
Under the Code, the affirmations of fact must become part of the "basis
of the bargain."" Despite this difference in language, the reliance qualification
of the Sales Act probably applies under the Code as well."
V. NEGLIGENCE—FAILURE TO WARN
Whether the cancerous elements in cigarettes inhere in the materials
used, or are a result of the manufacturing process employed, makers of
cigarettes should not be held liable for negligence unless they knew or
should have known of those harmful elements. 67 No duty to warn smokers
of the possible results of smoking can be implied while the defect was un-
knowable, but after manufacturers obtained such knowledge it became
61 Restatement (Second), Torts § 402B, comments (f), (j) (1965).
62 350 F.2d at 482.
63 The weakness in defendant's case seems to be the fact that the advertisements
were made over a long period of time—sporadically, between 1934 and 1953. See Pritchard
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 nn.4-13 (3d Cir. 1961).
64 Section 12 of the Sales Act defines express warranty as follows:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods
relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as
a warranty.
66 U.C.C. § 2 -313:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion or promise.
(2) [A]n affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement pur-
porting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does
not create a warranty.
66 Under the Code the seller's assertions must be "part of the basis of the bargain."
Thus, it would appear that seller's warranty should be known to the buyer and should
have induced him, in part, at least, to purchase the goods. 350 F.2d at 492 n.7. But see
Note, 38 Ind. L.J. 648, 650 (1963).
67 Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). See generally Levine,
Statutory Liability: The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act—Sword or Shield?
19 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 412 (1964).
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reasonable to require compliance with the common law duty to warn users
of dangers."
At some time before the Surgeon General's Report was published, cigarette
manufacturers did know or should have known of the reports that ciga-
rettes were probably the cause of or associated with many ailments." Failure
to warn during this period may have been negligent nonfeasance, but liability
does not necessarily follow because it is necessary to determine the exact point
in time the duty to warn arose. 7° Does notice of danger arise from the first
report of some obscure statistician? Whom should the manufacturers have
believed, and how many reports woud have been adequate to rebut the claim
that they were speculative? The latter question may now be moot, since the
Surgeon General's Report left little room for doubt as to the hazards of
cigarette smoking.
It is still necessary, however, to determine whether failure to warn was
the proximate cause of plaintiff's harm." Would the warning have come
before plaintiff contracted the disease? Would plaintiff have quit smoking
if he had been warned of the dangers to which his habit might lead? In any
event, the cigarette industry should not be relieved from liability when harm
which it could in fact have prevented was caused by its failure to do so.
VI. FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
One of the results of the Surgeon General's Report was the enactment
of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act which went into
effect on January 1, 1966.72 Its purpose was to ". .. establish a compre-
hensive federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with
respect to any relationship between smoking and health. . . ." 73 Specifically,
it required the cigarette manufacturers to display this warning conspicuously
on every package of cigarettes sold in this country: "Caution: Cigarette
Smoking May Be Hazardous To Your Health."74 Under its commerce clause
68 See Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 16 (1961). See also Restatement (Second), Torts
§§ 388, 394 (1965). For a leading law review article dealing with warnings, see Dillard
& Hart, Products Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 Va. L. Rev.
145 (1955).
09 From 1939 to 1963 there had been 29 retrospective studies of lung cancer, and
between 1950 and 1960 several notable organizations issued statements based on
accumulated evidence expressing concern over the cigarette-health hazard. Early in 1954
the Tobacco Industry Research Committee was established by the cigarette industry to
conduct a grants-in-aid program, collect information, and issue reports. Surgeon General's
Report, supra note 1, at 6-7.
70 The decision as to when the seller should warn may be determined either by a
subjective or an objective test. If the jurisdiction requires the seller to have actual
knowledge of danger the test is a subjective one; if constructive knowledge is required,
the test is objective. Annot.
71 Id. at 66.
72 79 Stat. 282 (1965), 15 U.S.C.A. ¢§ 1331 -39 (Supp. 1966).
73 79 Stat. 282 (1965), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Supp. 1966). The act falls far short
of carrying out its stipulated purposes and the program set out is hardly comprehensive.
The act merely requires a particular warning label to be placed on each package of
cigarettes sold in this country and suspends any further federal action until 1969.
74 79 Stat. 282 (1965), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (Supp. 1966). It is interesting to note the
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power,75 Congress prohibited the states and the Federal Trade Commission
from requiring any other label."
Congress declared that this warning adequately informs the public."
In fact, however, the warning does nothing for the public, either because
people already know of the harmful effects of smoking and are still not
deterred, or because the warning is not conspicuously displayed. The public
may not know of the variety and severity of the harm cigarettes cause, but
the warning label does nothing to educate them of those facts.
Although the statute requires the warning to be conspicuous, its place-
ment on one side panel, with nothing outstanding to call one's attention to
it, complies neither in law nor in fact. "Conspicuous" is defined in section
1-201(10) of the Code, where the test is whether attention can reasonably
be expected to be called to that which is meant to be noticed. That is, should
a reasonable person, against whom the warning is to operate, notice it? It
seems reasonable to suppose that most people would not see the cigarette
warning except by mere chance or by looking for it.
Instead of protecting the public, the act has probably been a "boon" to
the cigarette manufacturers. First, it establishes a national uniform label"
which is convenient and economical to the cigarette manufacturers since it
is conceivable that each state could require a warning different from that
of the rest of the states." Second, and more important from a legal stand-
point, is the fact that the cigarette manufacturers' common Iaw duty to
warn has probably been performed, and this may effectively relieve them of
liability for later harm which cigarettes may cause.
Alternatively, it is possible that the warning may serve as a disclaimer
of liability under the Code, even though section 2-316(2) of the Code re-
quires the mention of "merchantability" to disclaim the implied warranty
of merchantability. Realistically, it is difficult to see how this requirement
differences between the requirements of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act (FCLAA), and the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act (FHSLA), 74 Stat.
372, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73 (1964), in order to realize how little the former aids the con-
sumer. The FHSLA requires a description of the hazard; the FCLAA mentions only that
there is a hazard. The FHSLA requires the signal word to be spelled out in large capitals—
DANGER, WARNING, CAUTION; the FCLAA makes no mention of the size of type
to be used.
75 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
76 U.S. Code Cong. Sr Ad. News, 1675 (1965). The Federal Trade Commission is
empowered by Article 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1964), to take steps to protect the public from false or misleading
advertising (including labeling) of products that may endanger human health or safety.
The FTC was prepared to issue an order requiring warnings in advertising and labeling
that mention not merely that cigarettes are hazardous, but also how they may be hazard-
ous. 29 Fed. Reg. 530 (1964). Note that the legislation forbidding this action by the
FTC merely provided that the warning state that cigarettes may be hazardous to health.
77 Assuming the warning label would be noticed, it is questionable that it is an
adequate warning of the dangers of cigarette smoking. An adequate warning should
alert persons to the dangers being warned against. Dillard & Hart, supra note 68, at 160.
7 S 79 Stat. 282 (1965), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (Supp. 1966).
79 See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 131-32 (1913).
1004
SMOKING-CANCER CASES
could apply to consumer purchases, since the word "merchantability" is
probably meaningless to most consumers. 8°
It is more reasonable to suppose that a warning, written in terms he can
understand, will have a greater impact on the consumer, providing him with
a clearer awareness that he is taking upon himself the risk of harm at the
same time that the manufacturer is disclaiming responsibility for any harm. 81
Perhaps such a warning may be made to fall within section 2-316(3)(a) as
". . . other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty. . . ."
Having been warned of danger and proceeded in the face of it, a plaintiff
will probably have no basis for maintaining an action under the Code.
Defendant may argue that, because of the general nature of the product and
because the plaintiff smoked the cigarettes aware of the health hazard, no
implied warranty as to their safety was ever given. Alternatively, the de-
fendant may assume there was a warranty but argue that because plaintiff
knew of the danger prior to his use of the product, the breach of warranty
was not a proximate cause of the injury.
VII. CONCLUSION
The legal issues raised by the smoking-cancer controversy do not resolve
themselves satisfactorily, mainly because they are inextricably woven into a
social and economic pattern which cannot be ignored. The size and strength
of the cigarette industry, the unknown scope of the damages, and a general
public attitude that smoking is inherently wrong may, in the final analysis,
resolve the controversy in favor of the manufacturers. If cigarettes prove
to cause more intolerable harm, then appropriate action should be taken
by Congress. Such action, however, must have a broad base of public support
in order that a habit so deeply engrained in a large portion of the population
can be extinguished.
MICHAEL J. BALANOFF
80 See Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and War-
ranties, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 285 (1963).
81 Although-disclaimers of implied warranties are generally disfavored by the law,
the warning may nevertheless be regarded as such:
•	 [T]he rationale of assumption of risk supports recognition of disclaimers
only when the buyer is aware of the risks he assumes, the product is not essential
to a basic standard of living, and the commodity would not be produced or
sold if disclaimers were not recognized. However rare a consumer sales transaction
which fulfilled these conditions, a disclaimer of warranty would on this theory
be possible.
Note, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 318, 332 (1963).
82 Section 2-7I5(2)(b) of the Code requires the breach of warranty to be the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury in order for him to collect damages.
1005
